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Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles
ABSTRACT
There is an extensive empirical literature on political business cycles, but
its theoretical foundations are grounded in pre-rational expectations macroeco-
nomic theory. Here we show that electoral cycles in taxes, government spending
and money growth can be modeled as an equilibrium signaling process. The cycle
is driven by temporary information asymmetries which can arise if, for example,
the government has more current information on its performance in providing
for national defense. Incumbents cheat least when their private information
is either extremely favorable or extremely unfavorable. An exogenous increase














At one time, research on political business cycles received a great deal of
attention. Nordhaus (1975) and McRae (1977) provide important examples.1 Their
models suggest that politicians will inflate during election years in order to
exploit a Phillips curve tradeoff which is more favorable in the short-run than
in the long-run. Interest in these adaptive expectations models waned, however,
after the rational expectations revolution of the seventies. As long as private
agents (such as wage setters) understand the government's incentives, one would
not expect to observe any systematic rise in employment prior to elections.2
But the objections to conventional political business cycle models go beyond
their Phillips curve formulation, and apply to any model in which the government
takes artificial measures to make itself look good. Suppose the government
tries to please the public before elections by raising transfers or by lowering
taxes; according to Tufte (1978), this is the most robust empirical charac-
teristic of the electoral cycle. Why should voters prefer a candidate who is
suboptimally distributing tax distortions over time? Moreover, why should such
actions suggest that the incumbent will do a good job over the course of the
coming term?
Here we argue that electoral cycles in certain macroeconomic policy
variables —-suchas taxes, government spending, deficits and money growth
--derivefrom temporal information asymmetries.3 We assume that the government
observes an indicator of its performance (e.g., in providing national defense
efficiently) before the representative voter does. Administrative performance
is correlated over time; hence prior to election periods the incumbent has an
incentive to try to "signal" that it is doing well. This gives rise to an elec-
toral cycle in macroeconomic policy. (It is important to stress that our model
does not directly provide a rationale for an electoral cycle in unemployment.)42
In section II we present the basic model. 3ovrnments in this setup are
differentiated in part by their level of "competency". Although the analysis
could be extended to encompass other aspects of a government's performance,
the notion of competency that we use is as follows: The more competent that
a government is, the less revenue it needs to provide a given level of govern-
ment services. This particular measure of competency stresses the administra-
tive abilities of the policymaker. Naturally, other things being equal,
voters prefer more competent governments. The government obtains information
about its (serially correlated) competency more quickly than voters can.
However, at the beginning of each period voters receive a signal; they learn
the level at which the government is going to set income or poll taxes.
Because taxes are set at the beginning of the period, any (intentional or
unintentional) error the government makes must be made up through issuing
bonds or drawing seignorage. (In another variant of the model, government
spending can also be adjusted.) Thus the public observes the government's
competency directly, but with a lag. During an election year, a vote-
conscious incumbent party has incentive to make its most recent "competency
shock" appear large. The incumbent party's incentive to "cheat" (rely on
excessive seignorage or bond financing) is tempered only by the fact that it
places some weight on social welfare.
There is oniy one really important difference between the incumbent party
and the opposition party in our model. The opposition party has no credible
way to "signal" the effectiveness of its policies. Obviously, there are many
factors other than "competency" which influence the outcome of an election, but
our model treats these as exogenous. Nevertheless, the framework developed here
is sufficient to capture the essential elements of a political business cycle.3
In section III, we consider equilibria in which voters' expectations
depend only on known characteristics of the two parties, past observations on
the competency shocks, and the government's most recent tax bill.In particular,
expectations do not depend on how much a party might have "cheated" (set taxes
suboptimally low) in previous elections. The equilibria in section III are the
only possible equilibria when the political parties have finite horizons, given
the assumed information structure. Using only mild restrictions on the utility
functions, we are able to prove the existence of a unique separating equilibrium.
In the separating equilibrium, voters are able to exactly infer the incumbent's
information from the tax bill. Because the competency shock is directly observed
by the public with a lag, there is never any "cheating" (suboptimal use of
seignorage or bond financing) during off-election periods.
During election periods, the equilibrium has the following characteristics:
If the incumbent party knows that its competency shock is the lowest possible,
then it will not cheat at all. This result obtains even if the incumbent's
temptation to improve its image is greatest when its competency is lowest.
Cheating is increasing over a range of realizations of the unobservable
competency shock, but is declining at higher levels of competency. Incumbents
of intermediate ability cheat the most. (This conclusion must be amended if
there is an upper bound to the level at which taxes can be set.) The model also
yields some interesting conclusions with respect to changes in observable
factors. For example, the conventional wisdom is that the incumbent party will
inflate less if it becomes more popular for noneconomic reasons. We show,
however, that although an increase in popularity may cause the incumbent to
cheat less if its unobservable competency shock is high, it will cheat more if
its competency is low.4
1r ecticn IV, e examine other equilibria which can arise if the two
political parties have infinite horizons. If their discount rates are low
enough, then there will exist an equilibrium in which there is no macroeconomic
policy cycle. "Enforcement" of the cooperative equilibrium can come through a
number of related channels, including both voters' expectations and the strate-
gic interactions of the two political parties. If the parties have sufficiently
high discount rates, there will always be a cycle, but it may be damped. We
illustrate some properties of sustainable equilibria for this case. Finally, in
section V. we briefly consider what happens if the incumbent party cannotper-
fectly project its revenue needs; i.e., has imperfect information about its com-
petency shock. The analysis of section III generalizes even if the forecast
error is strictly private information. In the conclusions, we discuss some
empirical implications of our model, and some possible extensions.5
II. The Model
Every other period, atomistic voters choose between the two political
parties, "R" and "0". A major factor in the election is voters' perception of
the relative "competencies" of the two parties. A party'scompetency is
defined as follows: All governments are required to provide a fixed level of
government services, G.(The operative assumption is that G is observable,
not that it is fixed.) The more competent the government, the less revenues
it requires to deliver G:
(1)
where e is the government's competency, T is direct taxes (or transfers if
negative), andrepresents seignorage or bond-financing. "Competency" is
a broad index which captures the administrative abilities of the incumbent
party, and the success of its policies in providing necessary government services
efficiently. For example, a highly competent government will use well-designed
bidding procedures on government contracts, and will make good choices about
which weapons systems to purchase. (Although the analysis below focuses on the
definition of competency embodied in (1), it would be possible to apply our
framework to other measures of a government's performance).
The underlying macroeconomic model is rudimentary. rn each period t,
every voter receives a fixed, known amount of the perishable good. Agents pay
a total of Tt in real taxes. Money is required to conduct transactions, and
the transactions technology is such that the equilibrium price level,P, is
increasing in the money supply, Mt. We assume that there is no bond financing
and that seignorage revenues, =
(Mt
-
Mt_i)/Pt,are strictly increasing in
Mt over the relevant range. Our analysis applies equally well to the case of6
bond financing if taxes are d-istortionary. In this case there generally
exists an optimal distribution of tax distortions over time.5
Each of the identical voters has a time-separable indirect utility
function, which depends on the incumbent's competency, e,thelevel of distor—
tions arising from seignorage or suboptimal deficit financing, A, and exoge-
nous noneconomic factors which depend on which party is in power, i.(Itis
straightforward to extend the model to allow for different voters to have
different preferences with respect to exogenous factors.) Social welfare in





whereW:)—A,A( -Ris twice—continuously differentiable, except possibly at zero.
W'>(-<)O for A >(<)O, and W" >0.Thus, W is minimized at A = 0, and
W(A) -*ooas
Each party's competency shock is serially correlated so that for party
j=0, R
(3) = +
where{a} is an i.i.d. stochastic process on A E(O,a(,where a may be
infinite. It is assumed that a0 and aR are independent Vs,t, that they have the
same twice-continuously differentiable distribution function, and that
E...1(a) = .Itis crucial that {c} display some serial correlation, or there
would be no reason to vote for a party just because it appears more competent
today. The assumption that the competency shocks follow MA(1) processes simpli-
fies the analysis by making it possible for elections to be independent.
However, we present results in section III indicating some qualitative features7
of the more general case. The fact that the shocks vary over time may be
justified by noting that the leaders of a political party change, and that
policy prescriptions suited for one historical episode may be inappropriate in
other circumstances.
We assume that exogenous, party-specific, non-economic preference shocks
also follow a MA(1) process so that
R D
(4)
where {q} is an i.i.d. stochastic process on R. Furthermore, the density
function of q is unimodal, continuously differentiable, and symmetrically
distributed around zero.
Any promises the two parties might make before an election have no
impact on the voters in our model.(All the voters are from Missouri.) What
does make an impression on voters is their observations on the incumbent party's
performance, from which they can infer something about its most recent
competency shock. (We will describe the information structure shortly.) The
macroeconomic policy cycle will arise because the incumbent party has an incen-
tive to try to signal that its most recent competency shock is high. The
opposition party can make promises, but it lacks an effective way to reveal
how well it would have performed if it were currently in office. In fact,
all the public knows about the opposition party is the probability distribu-
tion of its competency factor, c. Because Eisan MA(1) process, the fact
that the opposition party may once have been in power is not relevant.7
It would be pointless for the incumbent party to try to deceive the public
unless it has an information advantage. Our assumptions about the information
structure and the timing of elections are as follows. The incumbent party has8
coiitnipUraneous irifurmation about its most recent competency shock, a (In
sections III and IV, the information is perfect; in section V it is not.)
Citizens observe a only with a one-period lag. however, at the beginning of
each period, voters receive a signal from the incumbent in the form of a
per-iod—t tax bill. (When setting taxes, the incumbent party does not yet know
the most recent exogenous shock to voters' preferences.) After receiving
their tax bill and observing citizens vote if it is an election period. At
the end of the period, markets meet and the price level is determined. If the
government set taxes too low, it will be forced to use the inflation tax to
balance its budget. (Again, our results extend to bond financing if taxes are
distortionary.) Citizens can infer and at this point, though we make
the stronger assumption that citizens learn enough by t+1 to observe
directly. The above scenario is consistent with the lag between conception
and implementation of fiscal policy. See figure 1.
At time t, voters will prefer party R to party 0 if their expected utility
from having party R in office during periods t+1 and t+2 is greater than that
from having party 0 in office. Thus, party R will win if
(5) E[Q1 + +2
- + 0,
where is the expectations operator conditioned on tinie—t public information,
which includes a1 Tt, 0i _1and Wewill temporarily conjecture that
voters' expectations about and t+2 (suboptimal use of seignorage) do not
depend on which party wins. Thus
(6) E[(W1+ W2) —(W1÷W2)] =0.9
This assumption will turn out to be correct in equilibrium because:
(a) no party ever chooses to inflate in the off-election year t+1, and
(b) conditional on time t information, a÷2 and a2 have the same distribu-
tion. Thus, despite the fact that t+2 will turn out to be a function of
voters have no information at time t to help predict which party will set
t+2 higher. Assumption (6) must be relaxed whenand q follow more general
stochastic processes.
As the opposition party D has no way to signal its most recent competency
shock, then by (3),
PR R D D PR




PR R 0 0
(8) E(r1+1+ t+2 t+1 t+2 =
Thus,by (2) and (5) -(8),when party R is the incumbent it will win if8
(9)E(a)_a+qO.
The incumbent party, R, does not observe the disturbance to voters'
preferences, atthe time it sets taxes. Therefore its estimate of the




Given our assumptions about the distribution of q (see eq. (4)), we can infer
that U is twice-continuously differentiable, strictly increasing in E(a),
UrnU'[E(a)] =0,and that U"[E(a)) >N)0as E(a) <(>) &.
E(a)-'10
We now specify the objective functions of the two political parties. Each
party aims to maximize a present—discounted-value functional which depends or,
(a) their probability of being in office, and (b) the social welfare losses due
to suboptimal use of seignorage or bond financing.10 The R party's objective
function is
(11) =Et[Xk-t u- (1-x)k-tW(k)],
keS k=t
where S is the set of even-numbered (election) periods, I is the (possibly)
infinite time horizon, and x is the weight the party places on being elected;
x is contained in the open interval ]0,1[. Party D's utility function is
identical
Because the assumption that the policymaker has a temporary information
advantage over the public (at least, off the equilibrium path) drives the
results below, we need to discuss the reasonableness of our specification:
The representative voter understands the model. However, it is not worth it
for him as an individual to monitor the government closely enough to have
complete contemporaneous information on how effectively the government is
spending his tax dollars. It is certainly reasonable to assume that a voter
does not engage in costly information-gathering activities solely to decide
his own vote, which has infinitesimal weight. Implicitly, we are assuming
that other information which the voter does gather (because it is worthwhile
in his production or consumption activities) does not allow him to directly
observe a (until t÷1). We are, of course, also assuming that statements from
the opposition party cannot be trusted, and that there is no public watch group
which can provide free, complete and unbiased information.11
Another variant of our model involves interpreting G + c as the effective
level of government services. The public only observes expenditures, G. This
seems quite realistic if one views 6 + e as national defense, given the secrecy
of military documents. (The country would not necessarily want to make these
documents public just to mitigate the political business cycle.) During an
election year, the incumbent might have an incentive to shave 6 and T, claiming
that military preparedness is adequate because the funds are being used
efficiently (high c). More generally, our model will suggest why the incumbent
is likely to cut back on expenditures which have low short-run visibility, and
focus on expenditures (and tax reductions) which have high immediate visibility.12
III. Finite-Horizon Equilibrium
In this section, we analyze the case where the two political parties have
finite time horizons. Because the information asymmetries are temporary, and
because the random disturbances are MA(1) processes, each election cycle turns
out to be independent of previous election cycles. We are able to show that
there exists a unique (perfect) separating equilibrium, in which the incumbent
party's action (tax bill) fully reveals its information (competency shock).12
We also demonstrate the qualitative features of the model described in the
introduction.
If there were full information, so that voters knew the competency shock
at election time, then the incumbent party would have no incentive to cheat.
For then it could not possibly influence voters' perceptions of its competency.
Moreover, by cheating, it would only lower social welfare by increasing
seignorage distortions. With asymmetric information, however, the incumbent
party may have an incentive to lower taxes in election years to try to
exaggerate its competency. We will temporarily posit that voters recognize this
incentive and believe that the level of inflation (cheating) depends on the
government's competency shock, Later, we will verify that if voters have
rational expectations, then this supposition is correct. Denote the voters'
conjecture of inflation as a function of a. by
(12) =
wherethe superscript referring to the political party has been dropped for
notational convenience.13 Then by equation (1), voters believe that the tax
bill as a function of is
Il — *1 T —a
—13
where g.G -a_1.We temporarily assume that r* is continuous and
strictly decreasing. Then r* has an inverse function, T*_l and the public's
time-t expectation of is
(14) E() =r*1(g_a -
Substituting(14) into (10), and the result into (11) yields the incumbent
party's maximization problem
(15) max {xU(T*_l(g_a_A)](1-x)W(A)), Va,
where the subscript t has been dropped. Given the public's beliefs (12), the
incumbent party's choice of A affects only current-period elements of its
objective function, (11).




In a separating equilibrium, voters' conjectures must be consistent, and
hence A* =AVa. Thus, equations (16) and (17) can be rewritten as the interior
equilibrium conditions:





where we have made use of the fact that f [f(x)] =1/f'(x),and f1[f(x)] =
- f"(x)/[f'(x)]3.Inspection of (18) confirms our assumption that T*-is
continuous and strictly monotoruic, since T' =- (1÷A').
The second-order condition (19) allows us to rule out equilibria involving
negative A:
Proposition 1. If A maximizes (15) and if voters' conjectures are consistent,
then A(a) cannot be strictly negative for any a.
Proof. By (13), T' =— (1+ A'). By (18), T' > (<) 0 for every a if and only
-if A < (>) 0 for every a. Differentiating both sides of the equilibrium
condition (18) with respect to a gives
(1+A') xU"
(20) A" =xU' tl+A' —(1-x)W"A'].
Substituting (20) into (19) gives the result that the second-order condition
holds as long as W"/(l+A') > 0.
Note that the proof of proposition 1 also established that (19) holds for
every A > 0 which solves (18). The proof required WI' > 0, but did not need
any restrictions on the sign of U". The intuition behind this is that in
equilibrium, U is not a function of the choice variable.
Equation (18) is a first-order differential equation with no apparent
initial condition. The next proposition provides a boundary condition.
Proposition 2. A perfect equilibrium requires A(0) =0.
Proof. By proposition 1, A(0)0. Assume that voters' expectations A*(a) are
governed by (18) with initial condition A*(0) =a> 0. Define
0(a) axU(0)-(1-x)W(0)-xU(a)+ (1_x)W(A*(a)].15
Since U(O) is the lower bound on U, D(a) represents the minimum gain to a type a
who defects and sets A =0instead of equal to A*(a) > 0. Clearly 0(0) > 0 for
A*(o) =ö.Furthermore, since 0 is continuous in a, there exists a neighborhood
of zero in R+ such that D(a) > 0. Hence defection is not a probability measure
zero event, since all a within a neighborhood of zero will defect.
Comment. It might seem that the "natural" boundary condition would be
A(a) =0rather than A(0) =0.The best type cannot gain by posing as a better
type. Proposition 2 tells us, however, that it is a =0who gains nothing by
cheating in equilibrium. As long as other agents are cheating enough so that,
by (18), it is not worthwhile for a =0to raise A above A*(o), then he might as
well not cheat at all since he will be recognized as a zero in equilibrium
anyway.
The proof of proposition 2 relied on the fact that T
level of taxes. Suppose there exists some Tmax < g such
exceed Tmax. (It would be plausible to posit that taxes
above rmax without fundamental changes in the tax system,
would take several periods to implement.) Then A*(0) =g
consistent conjecture for voters. The proof is analogous
proposition 2.14
The incumbent party's maximization problem (15) does not always have an
interior solution on all of A. This issue definitely arises if
W'(O) lim W'(A) > 0. Suppose for example that
(21) Q(a)xU'(a) —(1—x)W'(O),
is strictly negative for a =0.Then (18) implies that A'(O) is negative, but
this possibility is ruled out by propositions 1 and 2. Since U" > 0 for a < a,
= gis a feasible
that taxes cannot
cannot be raised
and that these changes
-Tmaxis the only
to the proof of16
it is possible that Q(a) >0for some a >0.Denote the smallest a such that
Q(a)0 as aL. (If Q(a) <0Va, let aL =a.)Then consider a solution
path to (18) initiating at A(aL) =0.It is easy to show that A will initially
rise from zero, but eventually will decline and cross the a axis from above at
some aM <.(See Appendix A. If W'(0) =0,the curve may asymptote to the a
axis rather than intersecting it.) Furthermore, it must be true that Q(a) is
strictly negative for all a aM (since U" <0for a >&).This leads us to
proposition 3.
Proposition 3. A =0for a aM and for a
aL.
Proof. Suppose voters believe A*(a) =0VaaM. so that
(22) T*l(g_a_A) =g-(g-a-A)=a+ A Va
aM.
Then since Q(a) <0VaaM, A =0is optimal for a aM. The proof of the
second half of proposition 3 is similar and is subsumed in the proof of
Theorem 1 in Appendix A.
Definition 1. A separating equilibrium is a continuous function A5: A -
suchthat
(i) AS =0if a aL.
(ii) A5 satisfies (18) ifaL a <aM.
(iii) AS =0if a aM.
Theorem 1. A unique separating equilibrium exists.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The solid line in figure 2 is a graph of the equilibrium A function.
(There can be more than one turning point.) Figure 2 is drawn for17
the case where W'(O) > 0, so the solution to (18) intersects the a axis from
above instead of asymptoting to it. To understand the figure, it is helpful to
consider two closely neighboring realizations of the competency shock,a2 and
a.1, a2 > a1. Suppose both a types are thought to cheat by the same amount,
=A*(a1).Then when the incumbent party draws a., it would have to set
A =A*(a)+ a2 -
a1in order to convince the public it had drawna2. In
deciding whether to take this action, the incumbent would compare the increased
expectation of winning with the marginal social welfare cost of distortions. If
U' is high, and if A and hence W' is low, then the temptation to cheat is great.
To discourage an a1 type incumbent from defecting, it is necessary to force it
to cheat more to gain any given increase in votes. This implies AS(a) > AS(a)
Good types must "run away" from bad types. As A rises, W' rises and the temp-
tation to cheat falls. Since U' begins to fall at a, must eventually begin
to fall. The dotted line in figure 2 is a graph of AS for the case where type
zero must use seignorage since g -Tmax> 0. In this case, cheating may be
strictly decreasing in a.It is simple to prove that AS(a) is nondecreasing
maxl5 lng—T
Wehave shown that a unique separating equilibrium exists. We now discuss
pooling equilibria. First, note that a pooling equilibrium would have to
involve a range of a types setting the same level of T (taxes), not the
same level of A (seignorage). Recall that voters observe T =g-a-
notA(a). Second, there cannot be a pooling equilibrium where voters ignore
taxes completely, even though politicians would then have no incentive to
cheat. In this case, the incumbent party's tax bill would fully reveal its
type, and it would not be rational for voters to ignore this information. So
a pooling equilibrium must involve having all a on some interval (a11a2] set
the same level of taxes. But this cannot be an equilibrium if voters' mapping18
from taxes to competency is monotonic. Suppose all types a[a11a2]set
T= Ta.Then E'[a)T =Ta)=aawhere is the mean value of a on [a1,a2].
But faced with these expectations, type a2 has an incentive to set taxes
slightly lower. He thereby gains a discrete increase in votes, a2 -a8,at the
cost of an infinitesimal rise in seignorage distortions. The only pooling
equilibria that might exist in our model would have to involve perverse (and
nonmonotonic) expectations. For example, the following type of pooling
equilibrium might exist: Voters believe a =& ifT =T,and believe a =0
otherwise. It would seem very reasonable to rule out such equilibria.16
We now turn to establishing some comparative statics properties of the
model. Define i(a,x) as an equilibrium path for a given value of x, the
weight the two parties place on votes. (For the remainder of this section,
we omit the "s" superscript.)
Proposition 4. a(a,x)/ax0 Va, with strict inequality if >0and a >0.
Proof. If aL >0,then xU'(aL) =(1-x)W'(O),and U(aL) >0.Thus aaL/ax 0,
with strict inequality if >0.Consider first the case aL =0.Then by
(18), for a aM,
aA'(a,x) U'(a) xUt(a)W"[(a,x) .8(a,x)
aX (1—x)W'[i(a,x)] (1—x)W'[A(a,x)] aX





because A(O,x) =0Vx impliesaA(0,x)=0.The function as/ax is continuous
in G;hencethere exists a deleted RHS-neighborhood N of zero where
aA(a,x)/ax >0,Va c N. Now suppose there exists an a >0such that19
aA(a,x)/ax <0.Then it must be the case that there exists an a* >0such that








'> 0within a RHS-neighborhood of a*. And this is a
contradiction.
If aL =& > 0,then clearly a(&)/ax >0and otherwise the proof is the
same as when =0.
As x rises, the incentive to cheat rises. Equilibrium requires that
each type must cut taxes by more to pose as the next highest type. Thus
"good" types must cheat more relative to "bad" types. Since by proposition 2,
A(0) =0,then A must rise for all a >0.The same result obtains if
A(0) =g-Tm.In figure 3, we illustrate proposition 4.
Now suppose that voters like the incumbent party for observable "noneconomic"
reasons, indexed by the parameter u. In particular, suppose we modify equation
(9) so that the incumbent party wins if
(24)v+E(a)_a÷q)0.
In order to maintain our assumption that E(At+2) is the same for both parties,
we will assume that the popularity disturbance is transitory, affecting only




Define b(av) as an equilibrium A function for a given value of v.
Proposition 5aA(a,v)/av0 for a +v<a,with strict inequality if
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 4.
Proposition 5 contradicts the conventional notion that more popular
incumbents are less likely to engage in a political business cycle.17 If the
incumbent party draws a low a, then a rise in its popularity increases its
temptation to cheat. As a +vrises from zero to a, a small amount of
cheating yields larger and larger benefits in terms of increased probability
of election. Only for a +v>a,so that U" <0,can an increase in popularity
lead to a lower level of cheating.
Proposition 5 deals with a small change in popularity, v. We conjecture
that a large increase -in v will move most types into the range where U' is
declining, and whereas some types will cheat more, most will cheat less.
Proposition 5 has a second important interpretation. The shift parameter v
may be viewed as an observable component of the incumbent's competency shock.
We illustrate proposition 5 in figure 4.
Thus far, we have only analyzed the government's behavior during even
(election) periods. But clearly, there will be no gain to cheating in of f-
election years, since the public will have observed a+1 by period t+2. This
supports our assumption in section II that expected inflation is the same
regardless of which party wins the election. If the c's followed a higher—
order MA process, then expected inflation in t+2 (conditional on t information)
would not necessarily be the same for both parties (by proposition 5).21
However, proposition 5 does not allow us to unambiguously state whether expected
t÷2 inflation ishigheror lower for the high c party. Also, we have only ana-
lyzed the case where the "R" party is the incumbent, but obviously the analysis
is the same when the "0" party is the incumbent. The fact that the parties tend
to move in and out of power (depending on competency shocks and voter preference
shifts) does not complicate our analysis because we assume that the public
directly observes in period t+1. If they were only able to observe
= +a1, then there would be a "start-up" problem whenever a new party
moves into office. (The public doesn't know and therefore can't sort out
and at.) This case ismuchmore complicated.
It should be emphasized that elections are not necessarily a bad thing,
just because they result in excessive inflation or a suboptimal distribution
of tax distortions over time. By holding elections, the public gets a more
competent government, on average. It is possible in principle to explicitly
analyze the tradeoff in a model such as the present one. But the exercise would
not be interesting without allowing for a richer stochastic structure.22
IV.Infinite-HorizonEquilibria
If the time horizons of the two political parties extend infinitely far
into the future, then equilibria which Pareto-dominate the "noncooperative"
equilibrium of section III will generally be attainable.18 There are three
related mechanisms for enforcing a more "cooperative" equilibrium. First, the
public can assume that a party which has defected in the recent past will not
cooperate during its next term(s) in office. The incumbent party must then
recognize that a defection will lower expected future social welfare and
thereby its own, since the social costs of distortions are an element of its
utility function. Second, if the public assumes there will be a reversion to
the noncooperative equilibrium next time the defector wins an election (and
hence higher expected distortions), then it will be less likely to vote for the
defector. The third mechanism for enforcing cooperation involves strategic
interactions between the two political parties. If the incumbent party cheats,
the opposition party can respond by cheating more the next time it is in office.
Since both parties care about social welfare, each may be willing to restrain
itself to keep the other party in line.19
When politicians have high discount rates, even the best attainable
equilibrium will involve some cheating. We illustrate why in this case, any
sustainable equilibrium will still have the characteristic that higher a types
cheat to "run away" from low a types, just as in the finite horizon case.
However, to enforce any cooperative equilibrium, it is typically not necessary
(to threaten) to punish very high a types as severely. Here punishments are
never actually meted out along an equilibrium path, but the issue is relevant in
the strictly private information setting of section V.23
There are a rich variety of supergame equilibria. However, it is
possible to exposit some of the general features of the infinite horizon
case if we consider a special class of equilibria in which only the first and
third enforcement mechanisms discussed above are relevant. Let T(a)0 Va
be a candidate cooperative equilibrium, and suppose the public adopts the
following trigger-strategy expectations:
20
Definition 2. Voters have a T(a) trigger strategy for A*(a) if:
(a) When t i odd, A(a) =0 Va.
When t is even, then
(b) à(a) =A(a)Va if At2(a) 42(a)1 or if t-2 =A2(a).
(c) b.(a) =A(a)f _2(a) =A2(a)and t-2 >42(a).
(d) A(a) =A,
where zero is the initial period.
The trigger strategy expectations described above have the property
that whenever the incumbent party defects and sets too high, then there
will be a temporary reversion to the noncooperative equilibrium, at the
next election in t+2. This reversion takes place regardless of which party is
in office, so expected inflation is the same for both parties and assumption
(6) is intact. Note that there is no punishment for cheating too little;
i.e., if A(a) 4(a).
Let us first consider conditions under which T(a) =0Va is a trigger-
strategy equilibrium. For the trigger strategies described in definition 2
the expected cost to the incumbent of defecting, P, is solely due to a higher24




where dF(a) is the continuous probability density of a. The expected cost P
will be the same for any > 0.
In deciding whether or not to defect, the incumbent party has to compare
its expected utility from defecting with its expected utility from
cooperating. If in period t voters believe the incumbent party will not cheat,
then by (13), T* =- aiand
(27) E1'(a(T) =g - T = a + A,
where time subscripts are omitted. If the party does not cheat, it attains
(28) LC(a) =xU(a)+ (1-x)W(0),
where LC stands for the party's utility level if it cooperates. If, on the
other hand, the party defects, it will attain
(29) L0(a) =max{xU(a+A) -(1-x)W(A)}-P.
A
Proposition 6.If L(a) -L0(a)0 Va, then AT =0Va is a
AT trigger strategy equilibrium.
The particular trigger strategy described in (a)—(d) involves only a one-
election punishment period. If P is insufficient to prevent all a types from
cheating, then it still may be possible to attain the zero-cheating equilibrium
by extending the (threatened) punishment interval. In general, the threatened25
punishment interval may be shorter when the incumbent draws a high a, since then
the potential gains from cheating are very small. (Since a is observed with a
one-period lag, conditional punishment strategies are feasible.)
If the incumbent's discount rate is very high, there may not exist any
punishment interval, or more general punishment strategy, sufficient to
discourage all a types from defecting. However, it may still be possible to
sustain an equilibrium which Pareto dominates the "noncooperative"
equilibrium.21Although we do not provide a general analysis of this inter-
mediate case, we do provide an example which illustrates some of the special
features of our model. We construct our example in a way such that the maximum
punishment, p, is given. In equation (11) of section II, the two political
parties are assumed to have a constant discount rate .Herewe assume that $
istime varying such that $(t) is much less than $(s) for all s >t.We assume
that after period t, $islarge enough so that a zero-cheating equilibrium can
be achieved in all future election periods. But $(t) is so small that the
zero—cheating equilibrium cannot be sustained in election period t.(It is
always possible to choose {$} to satisfy these assumptions.) To establish an
enforceable period—t trigger-strategy equilibrium, it is useful to ask what
would happen if voters think that no one cheats, so =0.
Consider an agent of type a. Let
(30) G(a,) xU(a+) -(1-x)W(A)-P-(xtJ(a)-(1—x)W(0)]
be the gain from cheating byrather than cooperating when A =0.By hypothe-
sis, there is some a c A such that there is a A >0where G(a,A)0. Let
a be the minimum such a and let A0 be the minimum A such that G(a01A0) 0.
Then a0 +A0is the minimum a type any other type a would ever be willing to26
"impersonate". Let A0 be the subset of A where the differential equation given
by (18) with initial condition (a0+A0) =0has a strictly positive solution,
AZ Let
AZ(a) a e A0
(31) A8(a) a
0 aeA/A0.
Clearly Va £A.See figure 4. We now show
Proposition 7. A =Ais the time—t part of a trigger-strategy equilibrium.
Proof. Clearly a party with a >a0
+willnot defect. If a party with
a <a0
+
A0wants to defect, then by construction it must want to pose as
a1 >a0
+A.But, since W" >0,then Va <a0






by (18); hence this is impossible.
is not necessarily the best sustainable trigger—strategy equilibrium.
However, it seems clear that the optimal A function must still begin rising
from zero at a0 + though possibly more slowly than by (18). Thus the optimal
equilibrium should have similar qualitative features to figure 5. Although we
have structured our example so that the punishment P is constant, the
equilibrium will have the general shape of figure 4 even if P is determined
jointly with a0 +A,the "start-up" point.27
V. Equilibrium When CheatinQ is Never Directly Observed
Until now, we have assumed that the incumbent government's information set
becomes common knowledge after a one-period lag. Thus in period t+1, the
public can directly confirm its inference about how much the government was
cheating in period t. Here we modify the information structure so that
electorate can never know for certain how much the incumbent cheated.22 Our
main purpose is to show that the results of section ru generalize.
We assume as before that in period t1, all agents observe the lagged
competency shock, ,andlagged seignorage (or bond financing), However,
seignorage and cheating are not equivalent if the incumbent party cannot
perfectly predict its revenue needs when setting Tt. In particular, suppose it
only observes the noisy signal 8 = where is an i.i.d. stochastic
process on (0,1], and is independent of a.
The analysis can be simplified somewhat with the assumption that the
social-loss function takes the special form:
(33) W =
Sincethe quadratic form of W implies certainty equivalence, it would be
socially optimal for the government to set
(34) TH(a(9)] =g-
where&(9) E(aIO).
Since the government has incentives to cheat as before, the public
believes that taxes are actually set according to
(35) T*[â(9)] =g-(9) -28
where we now refer to K rather than A as the level of cheating. K denotes
voters' expectations of Kt, given their observation on Tt. Ex-post, seignorage
may be high in part because the incumbent party made a mistake in predicting a.
and in part because it was cheating:
(36)
Despite the fact that the public never directly observes K, there still exists
a separating equilibrium analogous to that of section III. The steps involved
in deriving the equilibrium are as before. Equation (37) is the same as the




•1 K L — (1—x)Kfà(9)]
Again, the separating equilibrium reveals the incumbent's information (9). As
long as is observed in period t+2, the incumbent still has no incentive to
cheat in off-election periods. As in section III, this is the only equilibrium
in the finite-horizon case, and is an equilibrium in the infinite—horizon case.
The infinite-horizon trigger—strategy equilibria of section IV do not
extend directly to the case of imperfect monitoring. The observation that the
incumbent party needed to rely on seignorage or suboptimal bond financing no
longer implies that it has cheated. An interesting topic for future research
would be to find the optimal equilibria for this case, drawing on the literature
on repeated principal agent problems [see, for example, Radner (1985)].29
Conclusions
Our analysis illustrates the essential role of temporary information
asymmetries in explaining electoral cycles in macroeconomic policy variables.
Much of the extant empirical evidence on political business cycles deals with
national elections in the United States and Germany. Our model is broadly
consistent with this evidence. However, the general framework we develop can
also be used to examine other types of electoral policy cycles, such as those
associated with state and local elections.(In this case, of course,
seignorage will not be a factor, but bond financing still is.) A limitation
in applying our model to some other countries is that it does not allow for
endogenous timing of elections. Nevertheless, if there is a sufficient lag
between the time when elections are called and the time when they are held,
the general notion that the incumbent will try to look good remains relevant.
The analysis of the text focused on an electoral cycle in taxes, inflation
and deficits. But it is straightforward to extend the model to allow for
variable government spending. Consider again the highly plausible example where
the government has private information about the effective level of national
defense. The government might claim that it is efficiently obtaining a lot of
defense for any given input of expenditures. Therefore, it might signal its
competency by cutting defense appropriations. More generally, one would also
expect election—year shifts in the composition of government spending, towards
services with high immediate visibility (potholes), and away from expenditures
which the average voter only observes with a lag (contributions to government
pension funds).
It would be of interest to extend this framework to address other aspects of
political economy, and to allow for more differences between the two political30
parties. A related extension would be to allow for imperfect information
about the incumbent's preferences. But the rationale presented here for an
electoral policy cycle should carry over to these more general frameworks.31
Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1: Suppose xU'(O) -(1—x)W'(O)> 0. Then an
equilibrium is given by
xIJ'(a)
(1—x)W'(A(a)]




where c =0.Note that we have not ruled out W'(O) =0and A is not a domain;
hence we cannot immediately apply the standard existence and uniqueness theorem
for differential equations. For c e ]0,A(, it is useful to construct





U'(—a) if a < 0.
Let f(a,A)
xY(a) -1.The strategy is to show that there exists a
(1-x)W' (A)
unique solution, A(a), to
(A.2) =f(a,A); A(O) =C£ )O,A[,
and hence to (A.1) for c > 0. We then show that as c -÷0,the limit of the
solutions to (A.1) exists and satisfies (A.1) for c =0.In order to prove
the existence of a solution to (A.2), we need the following lemma.32
Lemma If a solution to (A.2) exists, then there exists a A A such that
< Vac A, if c <A.
Proof. Suppose Xt(a)0. Then
Y(a) <
-as A -A;hence A(a) must have an upper bound which is strictly less
than A.
f is a continuous function on the domain 0 s R x ]—A,A[ and c is an
interior point of D. Thus by theorem 10.1 in Ross (1965), (A.2) has a
solution c(C)t on [—h, h], where h (A -A)/maxIfI
>0.Likewise, (A.2)
with initial condition A(h) =(h),has a solution on [0,2h). Proceeding
in this manner we can show (A.2) has a solution on R. Then clearly (A.1)
has a solution on A, denoted by A(a)1 for c]O,AUJ.Denote the right-
hand side of (A.1) by g(a,A). By construction ofand the assumption that
W"/W' is uniformly bounded, ag(a,A)/aA <Mfor some M <, Vac A,
VA c [c,A[. Thus, by the mean—value theorem, g satisfies a Lipschitz
condition on A. By theorem 10.1 in Ross (1965), the solution A(a) is unique.
It remains to show that urn A (a) exists and satisfies (A.1) for c =0. c-0 C
Ifc decreases to zero, (A(a)} is non—increasing and bounded from below by
zero. Thus A0(a) =urnA (a) exists. A0(a) is clearly unique and satisfies
c-*0 C
(A.1).Va' >0,{A) is equicontinuous on aa'. Hence, A0 is continuous on
a >0.A0(a) is strictly increasing in a (for small a) and bounded from below
by zero. Thus, lim A =0and A is continuous on A. The first and second
a—0 033
derivatives of A,. are given by (A.1). They exist and are Continuous except
at =0(if W'(O) =0)and aM.
We have treated the case where aL =0,but clearly the case > 0 is a
trivial extension. The second part of proposition 3 is a straightforward
consequence of the fact that AS obeys (18) for all aLa < aM, and that W" > 0.
Note that the proof of Theorem 1 required, in addition to the assumptions on W
given below eq.(2) of the text, that W"/Wt be uniformly bounded on [c,A( for
C > 0.34
Appendix B
Here we provide an example for which eq.(18) has a closed-form solution.
The example has U" < 0, which requires that q(t) be asymmetrically distributed
and/or that the incumbent's current popularity v be high. (We can have q(t)
being asymmetrically distributed and yet retain eq.(6) if q is viewed as an
incumbent-specific shock rather than a party-specific shock.)
Example. U[E(aIT)] =ln[v+ E(aIT)]. and W() =lnB -ln(B-kI).Note
that W" > 0, so the example satisfies the second-order conditions derived in the







a linear first—order differential equation with solution
(82) (a) =B—(1-x)(v+a)+ C(v+a)1.
First we observe that if the arbitrary constant C =0,then cheating is
linear in a. This may seem like a natural equilibrium, but (O) =0requires
C =(l-x)1-8x/(1-x) It is easy to confirm that=0Va is an
1-x x x 1-x a
equilibrium if > •If > ,then > 0, and there is a range
of a over which the candidate cheats. It is also straightforward to confirm
proposition 4 with this example.35
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FOOTNOTES
There continues to be a significant amount ofempirical work on the topic,
especially in the political science literature. See, for example, Kirchgässner
(1985), Hibbs (1985), or Jonung (1985).
2McCallum(1978) makes this point. The conventional rationale for political
business cycles is also questioned by Stigler (1973). Nordhaus (1975) notes
that the cycle will disappear in his model, once voters understand the process.
3Cukierman and Meltzer (1985) have independentlydeveloped a related line of
research, though their approach is very different from ours. Backus and Oriff ill
(1985) adopt Kreps and Wilson's (1982) model of reputation to provide another
rationale for political business cycles. (Barro (1985) and Tabellini (1983)
present similar models.] In the Backus-Driffill model, the probability the
incumbent will inflate increases towards the end of his final term in office.
He inflates precisely because he is not worried about the future, and has no
incentive to maintain his reputation as an inflation fighter. By inflating
(more than anticipated), the benevolent and rational elected offical is able to
temporarily reduce the effect of distortions which keep employment below its
socially optimal value. This repeated game "reputational" model of political
business cycles seem at odds with Tuffe's (1978) evidence that the political
business cycle is more pronounced when the incumbent is up for re-election.
4McCallum (1978), and Golden and Poterba(1980), find little evidence of a poli-
tical business cycle in employment. The evidence of a political business cycle
in variables such as transfers and money supply growth is stronger (see Tufte
(1978), or the Hibbs and Fassbender volume (1981).)
5See Barro (1979).
6Our main results do not depend on theassumption that W is minimized at zero,
or that W is independent of r. There is however a general argument, due to
Kimbrough (1985), that the seignorage tax should always be set at zero even if
taxes on labor and consumption are distorting. Kimbrough argues that for any
reasonable transactions technology, money should be viewed as an intermediate
good in the production function, and not as a final consumption good. By a
standard theorem in public finance, it is suboptimal to tax intermediate goods
(since it causes a distortion on two margins), unless there are increasing
marginal tax collection costs.
71f c follows a higher-order stochasticprocess, then the public may take into
account the opposition's performance when last in office. The main effect this
will have on the analysis is to alter the probability the incumbent will win;
the resulting political business cycle is qualitatively similar.
81n (2), the representative voter is risk-neutral withrespect to e.If the
public were risk averse, then the fact that it knows more about the incumbent's
competency than the opposition's would make the incumbent's re-election more
likely. Allowing for this possibility should not alter the general nature of
the results.38
9when R is the opposition party, then uR =1-U0.The winner receives all the
votes only because we have not allowed for different voters to have different
values of q (party-specific preferences related to exogenous non-economic
factors). Our later analysis requires only that a party be more likely to win
the more competent it is perceived to be.
10The analysis would have to be modified slightly if parties also careddirectly
about the competency of the government. The main qualitative effect would be
that when the incumbent knows it has a high level of competency relative to the
mean value of the opposition's competency shock, then it will place a greater
weight on being elected. If on the other hand, the incumbent knows its com-
petency to be very low, then there is the (perverse) possibility that it might
prefer to see the opposition win.
11The main effect of relaxing the assumption that both parties place the same
weight (x) on social welfare would be that expected inflation in t+2 is no longer
the same for both parties. See proposition 4 in section III below. Because we
allow for fairly general U functions, the analysis can be generalized to where
parties care about their plurality, and not just their probability of winning.
12The possible existence of pooling equilibria will be discussed lateron.
We are grateful to Dilip Abreu for pointing out to us some formal analogies
between our model and the limit-pricing model of Milgrom and Roberts (1982).
See also Roberts (1985). Our model is not plagued by the existence problems
familiar from the information theory literature discussed in Riley (1979),
because voters face a single large agent.
131n the finite horizoncase, (12) is the only possible form for rational expec-
tations. Expectations conditioned on past behavior "unravel backwards". Other
equilibria are possible in the infinite horizon case, however; see section IV
below.
14 max * If g —T = A(0), then the type zero agent will not (cannot) defect by
setting A lower. (He is so incompetent that he cannot make ends meet without
relying on seignorage.) It is straightforward to show that no type a > 0 will
defect if A* =follows(18).
l5 is also straightforward to examine the case where there issome maximum
level of cheating, Am. may have a maximum if, for example, there
is a limit to how much seignorage can be extracted from money holders.
Suppose Amax exists, and the solution to (18) reaches Amax at some a
Then there is an equilibrium where A remains at Amax for a > a the max . z lowest a such that xU'(a) (1-x)W'(A ).Denotethis a as a .Fora a
the equilibrium path is again governed by (18), and A begins t decline. Te
proof is analogous to the proof of proposition 3.
16Theremay also exist semi—separating equilibria involving mixed strategies.
These equilibria involve perverse expectations, just like the pooling
equilibrium discussed in the text. They, too, can be ruled out by the assump-
tion that T*(a) is weakly monotonic. We have been implicitly using the notion
of sequential equilibrium; see Kreps and Wilson (1982), for example. By
appealing to a slightly stronger equilibrium concept, such as the one discussed
in Cho and Kreps (1985), it should be possible to definitely rule out all the
perverse equilibria with pooling, and be left with just the unique separating
equilibrium.39
17See, for example, Frey and Schneider (1978). There are several otherempiri-
cal studies which also attempt to relate presidential popularity to the severity
of the political business cycle. Golden and Poterba (1980) find no evidence of
a relationship.
18That the infinite horizon casemay yield outcomes with higher social welfare
is well—known. In the macroeconomics literature, see Barro and Gordon (1983),
or Canzoneri (1985), for example. The "election game" may end with some posi-
tive probability each period; this effectively raises the incumbent's discount
rate.
19Alesina (1985a,b), in the context of a Barro-Gordon(1983)/Kydland—Prescott
(1977) model, has shown how cooperation between two political parties can serve
to dampen post-election volatility in prices and employment. Wage setters
aren't sure which party is going to win, and hence cannot predict prices. The
two parties may implicitly "cooperate" and always choose the same post-election
monetary policy despite their different preferences vis-a-vis inflation and
unemployment. The winner of the election will follow the cooperative strategy
if the long-term gain in reduced volatility outweighs the short-run costs. The
"third" channel we refer to in the text is similar to Alesina's, except that our
analysis pertains to pre—election volatility.
20The trigger-strategy equilibria areanalogous to those discussed in Friedman
(1971).
is a fairly general result in infinitely repeated games. The class of
punishment strategies considered here involve a reversion to the finite horizon
equilibrium. It is possible that there exist more severe punishment strategies
in our model, analogous to those described by Abreu (1985).
22Canzoneri (1985) models private information in the framework of Barro and
Gordon (1983). His analysis is an application of the trigger strategy
equilibrium proposed by Green and Porter (1984). The model here is different in
part because there are a continuum of types (instead of one known type), each of
whom must be presented with the appropriate incentives.40
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